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Owing to the WTO exemption that allows governments to subsidize arms
exports, the arms trade is one of the few remaining areas of trade where we
observe export subsidies. This paper examines the e¤ect of arms controls, in
the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to subsidize arms exports and
conversely the e¤ect of the WTO arms trade exemption on the incentives to
break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms controls and
free trade commitments re-enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the
incentive to subsidise and free trade without subsidies reduces the bene…ts
of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens
the Nash ine¢ciencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower
subsidies and lower arms exports.
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The arms trade is an activity where foreign policy concerns such as security, human
rights and international stability interact and often clash with economic concerns.
One manifestation of this tension is the fact that among main weapon exporters
arms export controls often exist side-by-side with export subsidization. In the case
of the UK, for example, arms export subsidies in the form of cheap loans and credit
insurance guarantees for exporters constitute almost one third of the total volume
of subsidies provided by the Exports Credit Guarantee Department which amounts
to £9 billion (at 1995 prices) or almost 5% of the value of total exports1 (see Martin,
1999 and Martin, 2001).
However, the relevance of arms export subsidies becomes much higher if we follow
the de…nition of subsidy agreed by the World Trade Organization members (WTO)
in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures2 (ASCM, article 1.1).
According to this criteria, an export subsidy to a …rm would include not only direct
transfers of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusions) and potential direct
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guaranties) but also, indirect subsidies
channeled through purchases of goods by the government, among others. Following
this de…nition, military aid to importers, marketing advice to national champions,
subsidized export credit guaranties3 and a portion of national defence procurement
would all enter into the ‘export subsidy’ category4.
1Various NGOs and academics have argued that the UK subsidizes defence exports through
government payment of …xed costs and cheap loans through the Export Credit Guarantees De-
partment, however there are major di¢culties in obtaining accurate estimates, Chalmers et al.
(2002) further review the evidence.
2For detailed information on the WTO agreements see http://www.wto.org/
3For estimates of subsidies to arms exports through the use of export credit guarantees see
Bagci et al. (2003).
4In many occasions, domestic sales are crucial to the existence of domestic defence …rms, they
ensure that the …xed production costs and & costs of the …rm are covered. Still, one could
consider that domestic defence procurement only constitutes a subsidy to the …rm if the price paid
for such procurement is higher than the exports price. In our paper, the procurement price could
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Despite the fact that arms trade constitutes the …rst source of ‘legal’ trade in
the world, the WTO has given an exemption to arms exports subsidies. Therefore,
the categories of prohibited or actionable subsidies in the ASCM do not apply to
arms exports. This exemption is recorded in the General Agreement on Tari¤s and
Trade (GATT):
“...nothing in this Agreement shall be construed...to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests
(i) relating to …ssionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the tra¢c in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such tra¢c in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for
the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;...” (Ar-
ticle XXI, GATT, Security Exceptions).
Earlier work by the authors analyzed the regulation of arms exports and its rela-
tionship with procurement (Levine and Smith, 2000; Levine, Mouzakis and Smith,
2000; García-Alonso, 1999). In those papers, it was assumed that arms trade has
a negative impact on the security of the exporting countries. This negative impact
is justi…ed by the observation that arms exports can unstabilize regional arms races
thereby creating con‡ict situations that required external intervention or cause eco-
nomic uncertainty5. In those papers, arms exports were regulated by means of direct
controls such as export licenses, embargoes, etc. and there was no uncertainty facing
the government. García-Alonso (2000) introduces a combination of indirect controls
(R&D subsidies) and direct controls (export controls) to regulate arms trade.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the WTO exemption,
which allows governments to subsidize arms exports. Also, we analyze the addi-
in principle be higher or lower than the exports price.
5It is true that arms exports could sometimes increase the security perception of the exporter,
say if those weapons are bought by an ally. If that was the case, direct export controls would be
unlikely and therefore, our paper would not apply to that case.
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tional impact of informational asymmetries between governments and the weapon
producers. In our analysis, we introduce both national defence procurement and
price export subsidies as tools that governments use to regulate the arms export
market. In doing so, we attempt to re‡ect the variety of export subsidy tools which
can still be used by weapon exporters ‘thanks’ to the WTO exception.
Defence procurement has a number of distinctive characteristics. Rogerson
(1994) lists these as the importance of R&D, uncertainty, economies of scale and
the role of governments as the sole purchasers. Large R&D and other …xed costs
mean that suppliers need to sell on the international market in order to be commer-
cially viable, however, security concerns may lead countries to limit the amount or
quality of the exported weapons. This situation, where security concerns compete
with economic concerns, is a further distinctive feature of the defence procurement
process.
Uncertainty facing the procuring government can involve both demand and cost
conditions. This is re‡ected in the theoretical literature, which studies asymmetric
information and incentive contracts that force …rms to reveal their private informa-
tion (La¤ont and Tirole, 1993). The seminal work of Brander and Spencer (1985)
launched the strategic trade literature with the insight that strategic trade poli-
cies can exacerbate the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem facing oligopolistic …rms; i.e.,
the Nash equilibrium quantity sold by each …rm is higher than the quantity they
would each sell if they could form a cartel and multilateral government rent-seeking
subsidies make this problem even worse for the …rms. A recent trade literature
studies the impact of asymmetric information on optimal strategic trade policies.
Maggi (1999) analyses how asymmetric information a¤ects strategic trade policies
in a third market model.
Our paper introduces direct government transfers to the …rm, payments for na-
tional procurement, as a policy tool. In this respect, our model is closer to Brainard
and Martimort (1997). In their paper, price export subsidies and direct transfers
are combined to create a revelation mechanism that forces …rms to truthfully reveal
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their type when policymakers are incompletely informed. Due to the restriction on
export subsidization imposed by the WTO in most industries, this model structure
applies best to the existing regulatory framework in the exception – the arms in-
dustry. The direct transfers alluded to by Brainard and Martimort (1997) become
the price paid for defence procurement by the government. However, if such model
is to be applied to the arms trade, the security concerns which a¤ect this unique
industry and the export controls that exporter governments put in place must also
be considered.
In the case of the US, the world’s leading arms exporter, the O¢ce of Defense
Trade Controls (DTC), in accordance with sections 38-40 of the Arms Export Con-
trol Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2778-80) and the International Tra¢c in Arms Regula-
tions (ITAR)(22 C.F.R. Parts 120-130), controls the export of defense articles and
services by taking …nal action on license applications and other requests for approval
for defense trade exports and re-transfers6. Even if a license is awarded in the end,
the administrative compliance of these regulations imposes not only a delay in the
receipt of export revenues but also a delay in the security costs involved in arms
exports. This aspect of arms trade is re‡ected in our paper.
Administrative delays in the concession of import licenses have been recently
analyzed in Regibeau and Rochet (2001). They consider the case in which an im-
porting country may impose a delay on the foreign …rm in obtaining approval for sale
of a particular product, as opposed to the domestic …rm. Administrative delays are
presented as non-tari¤ barriers to trade. In our case, the administrative delay has
a very di¤erent ‡avour; it applies to exporters and its main objective is to increase
national security.
In this paper we show that arms controls and free trade commitments re-enforce
each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidise and free trade without
subsidies reduces the bene…ts of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Further-
more, we show that transparency actually worsens the Nash ine¢ciencies at play in
6For up to date information on defence export controls in the US check: http://www.pmdtc.org/
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that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an arms trade
model in which government or regulator procures a defence good from a sole na-
tional supplier who also sells in the world market. Weapon exporters compete in a
Cournot fashion in the exports market. Governments regulate arms trade using a
combination of policy tools: …rst they pay for national procurement, second they
subsidize/tax the exports price, third they have controls on arms exports in the
form of administrative delays, which a¤ect both exports revenue and security. Sec-
tion 3 considers a complete information structure, where the regulator knows the
cost function of the …rm and demand conditions and can therefore anticipate the
…rm’s choice of exports. In section 4, we contrast this benchmark case with the in-
complete information set-up where the exporting …rms possess private information
regarding their cost structure. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In each of  countries, a government or regulator procures a defence good from a
sole national supplier who also sells in the world market. Label countries  = 1  
and refer to variables in country  with a subscript . To ease the notational burden,
we omit the subscript in country 1. In that country, output is  = + units where
 is purchased by the government at a price  and  is exported,  is held …xed in
the analysis. In the international market for arms, the price is  (), where  is
world output. Total costs, consisting of …xed and variable costs, given by
() =  +  (1)
where  are …xed costs and  denotes marginal costs.
Since  is …xed, the payment  is in e¤ect a lump-sum transfer from the govern-
ment to the …rm7. In addition we allow the government two additional instruments:
7Our assumption of a …xed amount of domestic procurement is not a strong one given that
our marginal production costs are assumed to be constant. If the government chose  and left 
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a per-unit export subsidy  (or tax if   0) paid (as with the lump-sum transfer)
when production is completed, and a licensing delay  . The latter is the form that
the export regime takes and reduces the current value of $1 of arms revenue to the
exporting …rm to $
1
(1 + )
= $, say, where  is the rate of discount. Then assum-
ing that the exported military good paid for at the time of delivery, the single-period
expected payo¤ for the …rm is
 =  + ( () + )¡ () (2)
Given the level of procurement, , in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium …rms then choose
output to be exported given the aggregate output of all competitors in the interna-
tional market.
Total world exports give rise to a security externality modelled as follows. Let
the current value of security of producer country 1 associated with procurement 
and world exports  with delay  be ( ); 1  0 2  0. The property 2  0
captures the existence of negative security externality as a result of aggregate arms
exports to the world market, from the viewpoint of each producer.
Then a utilitarian form of the social welfare of producer country 1 is
 = ( )¡ (1 + )( + ) +  (3)
where (1 + ) is the social cost of a unit of taxation.
Substituting for  +  from (2), (3) can be written
 = ( )¡ (1 + )[()¡  ()]¡  (4)
Given the level of procurement, , and the multilateral arms control regime in place
re‡ected in the value of  · 1, the regulator’s choice variables are the procurement
price  and the per-unit export subsidy8, . These instruments are chosen subject
to a participation or individual rationality constraint  ¸ 0.
unchanged, we would still have a direct transfer to the …rm as such decision is taken prior to the
…rm’s exports choice.
8This subsidy is endogenously chosen and can therefore take any value, including and negative
value, in which case we would have an exports tax.
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Under complete information, the regulator knows the cost function of the …rm
and demand conditions and can therefore anticipate the …rm’s choice of exports.
We contrast this benchmark case with the following principal-agent problem: Given
procurement , the government chooses its price  and the export subsidy  but
cannot observe marginal cost parameter  in country . The distribution of the 
however is public knowledge to all countries. In choosing a procurement price and
subsidy the government now faces an adverse selection problem.
This problem is closest to the Brainard and Martimort (1997) case with a zero-
pro…t participation constraint. They assume di¤erentiated goods; here we have a
homogeneous good, but also a security e¤ect. We also allow for arms control in the
form of a licensing delay and for regulators with di¤erent preferences over consumer
surplus and …rm pro…ts. We now examine the complete and incomplete information
problems in turn.
3 Arms Exports under Complete Information
3.1 First-Best Choice of Arms Exports
As a bench-mark we …rst calculate …rst-best (FB), the choice of arms exports and
rent for each country that would be chosen by a utilitarian world social planner. The
mythical social planner has direct control over arms exports is constrained only by
the …rms’ participation constraints and has no need for licensing delay. We therefore
set  = 1. Total arms exports are chosen to maximize
P
=1 where is the social
welfare of the  country. In this section, we …rst study symmetric equilibria. Then
for the …rst-best, putting  = , this amounts to maximizing
 = ( )¡ (1 + )[( + )¡  ()]¡  (5)
with respect to  and  subject to the individual rationality condition (IR),  ¸ 0.




¡ (1 + )( ¡  ()¡  0()) = 0 (6)
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From this point onwards we restrict ourselves to the following linear functional forms
for the functions (¢) and  (¢)where  represents the weighting that exports have
on the security perception of the exporters:
() = ()¡  ; 0  0 (7)
 () = ¡  ;  2 [0 ]
= 0 ;    (8)
Assuming these functional forms and (1) for (), the social welfare function (5)
becomes
 = ()¡ (+ ¡1)
¡ (1 + )[ + ( + )¡ (¡ (+ ¡1))]¡  (9)
where total arms exports9  =  + ¡1 =  + ¡. Then the …rst order condition










3.2 The Constrained Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
Now consider the independent design of an arms export subsidy and procurement
programme when a licensing delay regime is in force. The following timing of the
game is now crucial:
1. Each government commits itself to a given arms export licensing delay, possibly
within a multilateral agreement, implying a discount factor  = 1
(1+)
.
2. Constrained by the commitment at stage 1, in a non-cooperative equilibrium of
the rest of the game, each government now independently chooses the procurement
price and subsidy ( and  for country 1).
3. Firms choose whether or not to participate.
4. Firms choose output.
9We use the standard notation: ¡ = 1 + 2 + ¢ ¢ ¡1 + +1 + ¢ ¢ 
9
5. Firms export with a delay  and receive the current value of  dollars for each
dollar of arms export revenue.
The appropriate equilibrium concept for this dynamic game with complete in-
formation is a subgame perfect equilibrium, found by backward induction. Starting
at stage 4, given  and  decided previously, given  which we take as exogenous,
and given the output of all other …rms ¡1, the …rm in country 1 maximizes, with
respect to , pro…ts given by (2). Substituting our chosen functional forms this
becomes
 = () =  + [¡  + ¡ (+ ¡1)]¡  ¡  (11)




[¡  + ¡ ¡1] (12)























=2(¡) = (¡1)¡¡1 = (¡1)+(¡2)¡1. In
addition, since the countries are identical in structure, we have that ¡1 = (¡ 1)




[(¡ 1)(¡  ¡ ) + ¡1] (15)
Using (12) and (15) we can solve for the Nash equilibrium of stage 3 of the game to
obtain:
 =






In (16)  is the no-subsidies constrained non-cooperative equilibrium. The last
term is the perturbation to the non-cooperative equilibrium brought about by sub-
sidies. Notice that in a symmetric equilibrium, ¡1 = ( ¡ 1) and this last term
becomes ((+ 1)) which is positive if the subsidy is positive.
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Proceeding to stage 3 of the game, the outside option of the …rm to choose not
to participate imposes the participation constraint  ¸ 0. At stage 2, in a Nash
equilibrium of this stage of the game, the regulator in country 1 chooses  and  so
as to maximize its social welfare given by (5), given the choice of subsidies by the
other regulators, ¡1, and given the participation constraint. The latter must bind,
and the regulator chooses the price of the procured good,  at its minimum value to
ensure this. Hence putting  = 0 in (5), and using our assumed functional forms,
we can write the social welfare function in country 1 as
 = ()¡  ¡ (1 + )([( ¡ (¡ )]¡ ) (17)
where we note that a licensing delay also a¤ects the security. The optimal subsidy
for country 1, given ¡1, must now satisfy the …rst-order condition:


= ¡( + (1 + ))













and from (15) that
 = + ¡1 =















Bringing together (18), (19) and (21) we arrive at the equilibrium level of exports






Comparing (22) and (16), some algebra leads us to the following proposition:
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Proposition 1
(i) Arms exports are higher under a subsidies programme (  ) i¤
  ¹ where
¹ =
(¡ 1)(¡ )(1 + )
(+ 1)
(23)
(ii) At the threshold value of the security parameter  ¸ ¹, subsidies dis-
appear and give way to a tax on exports.
(iii) Since from (i) ¹ is an increasing function of , the e¤ect of strengthen-
ing export controls (reducing ) is to lower the threshold ¹ and therefore
discourage subsidies as well as arms exports.
To understand these results let us …rst imagine countries in the no subsidy state
( = ¡1 = 0). A single country acting unilaterally can improve its situation by
acting as a Stackelberg Leader both with respect to its own …rm and the other
countries. Introducing a subsidy will result in higher exports by its own …rm and,
in the absence of retaliation by other countries, lower exports by its rivals, and
therefore higher market share. By choosing a subsidy at stage 2 of the game on
its reaction function at that stage, the country unambiguously bene…ts. However
this outcome is not an equilibrium. When other countries act is a similar fashion
setting subsidies simultaneously, the Nash equilibrium of stage 2 is an example of a
‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’: all countries subsidize, providing that the security parameter
 is below the threshold given in (23), market shares are equal and all countries
export more taking the equilibrium further away from the …rst-best10. From (16)
the equilibrium subsidy is then given by
 = (+ 1)( ¡ ) (24)
Thus relaxing arms controls (i.e., reducing ) encourages a higher subsidy and more
10Note that our model with  = 0 is very close to the strategic trade literature models, therefore,
the result that countries would then give export subsidies if acting in a noncooperative fashion is
not surprising (see Brander and Spencer (1985)). This result is not reversed unless the security
concern  is high enough to o¤set the pro…t incentive behind the subsidy.
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arms exports. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Under complete informa-
tion governments pay a procurement price that just satis…es the …rm’s participation
(or IR) constraint. As exports rise average costs fall and this threshold procurement
price also falls. The welfare ‘return’ on subsidies, which must be …nanced out of
distortionary taxes, arises from this reduction in the procurement price. As export
controls are relaxed this welfare return from a subsidy increases, thus increasing its
optimal value in equilibrium.
If countries cooperate then the …rst-best can be supported by the negative sub-
sidy (i.e., a tax):
 = (+ 1)( ¡ ) (25)
In the absence of cooperation if   ¹ then the security threat is such that subsidies
give way to taxes. From (23) the threshold ¹ is a decreasing function of  resulting
in (ii) of the proposition.
3.3 The Two-Country Case
In the next section of the paper, we assume incomplete information and we introduce
asymmetries between countries so that parameters , , , , ,  and ,
 =   are country-speci…c. Then, to ease the exposition, we restrict ourselves
to two countries, say ‘home’ () and ‘foreign’ ( ). We will compare the incomplete
information outcome with that under the benchmark of complete information which,
following a similar analysis to that above, has a subgame perfect equilibrium in
exports, ( ) given by














which reduces to (22) if  = 2 and parameters are equal in the two countries. The
subsidies that support (26) are given by
4 +  = ¡
3
1 + 
+  ¡ 2 +  (27)
4 +  = ¡
3
1 + 
+  ¡ 2 +  (28)
An important consideration for arms control regimes is their stability given that a
single country can bene…t from unilaterally relaxing or abandoning its arms control.
That is, the -country can bene…t from increasing . Using (9), for the -country
we can write the welfare as
 = ()¡(+)¡(1+)[(+)¡(¡(+ ))]¡ (29)
In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, (29) is maximized with respect to , given  .
Now write (29) as =  (   ). Then partially di¤erentiating with respect

















(30) provides a measure of the incentive of the -country to relax its arms control
policy by allowing the licensing delay to decrease (i.e., increasing ).
The demand and cost structure chosen for the model (linear demand functions
and constant marginal cost) has the property that in asymmetric equilibrium with




assumptions are chosen for reasons of analytical tractability, but have the disad-
vantage that the price is driven to zero as output increases. A more empirically
plausible demand function would take a constant elasticity form  = ¡ with an
elasticity   1 in which case the revenue is an increasing function of . Rather than
introduce this less tractable form, we con…ne ourselves to levels of output   
4
.
Maximum equilibrium output is reached in the subsidy regime where there are no
security concerns ( = 0). Then from (22) with n=2, the maximum output in a sym-
metric equilibrium is  = 2(¡)
5





or in other words   8
3
. The following propositions requires
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We can now prove the proposition:
Proposition 2
For small deviations in  about a symmetrical equilibrium with  =  ,
if condition (31) holds and   ¹ then:
(i) 












and therefore the ability to subsidise exports has
the e¤ect of destabilising the arms control regime.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the previous proposition. The wel-
fare gain from relaxing arms controls arises from the increased revenue (assuming
condition (31) holds) in current value terms, from exports. This may be welfare-
enhancing because it reduces the procurement price required to satisfy the …rm’s
participation constraint, a bene…t which must be weighed against the negative se-
curity e¤ect from increased exports. If (31) holds, the former outweighs the latter.
In a trade regime that allows subsidies, revenue from exports rises more than the
negative security e¤ect. The bene…t of a unilateral abrogation of the arms control
regime correspondingly rises, making the regime less stable.
4 Arms Exports under Incomplete Information
We now assume that the governments cannot observe the marginal cost parameter
 in country  =   which constitute asymmetric information only known to the
…rm in question. The distribution of the  however is public knowledge. We con…ne
ourselves to a multilateral agreement with equal licensing delays; i.e.,  =  = .
In choosing a procurement price and subsidy, the government now faces an adverse
selection problem. The sequencing of events is now:
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1. Each government commits itself to a given arms export licensing delay implying




2. Each government  =   independently designs a revelation mechanism consist-
ing of mappings  = () (implying a lump-sum ) and a subsidy  = ()
to induce truthful reporting and participation.
3. Firms choose whether or not to participate.
4. Firms report  = ^ and receives  = (^) and  = (^).
5. Given  and , …rms choose output including exports  ;  =   .
6. Firms export with a delay  and receive the current value $ for each $ of arms
export revenue.
The appropriate equilibrium concept is now a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). To solve for the PBE, we …rst solve for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
stage 5:
Stage 5. The Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Proceeding as for the complete information game between symmetric economies
above, with subsidies and procurement prices set in both countries, each …rm  =  
maximizes  with respect to  taking the output of its foreign rival as given. This
leads to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium:
 =
¡ 2 +  + 2 ¡ 
3
= (  ) (32)
 =
¡ 2 +  + 2 ¡ 
3
=  ( ) (33)
 =
+  +  ¡  ¡ 
3
=  (  ) (34)
 = ( ¡ ) + 
2
 ¡  = (  ) ;  =   (35)
Stage 4: Truthful Reporting
Given the mechanism  = () and  = (), if …rm  reports ^ and …rm 
reports truthfully (which happens in equilibrium), then …rm  produces
^ =
¡ 2 +  + 2(^)¡  ()
3
= ^(^  ) (36)
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say, and receives rent
^ = ((^)¡ ) + ^
2
 ¡  = ^(^   ) (37)
which depends on both  and  . The home …rm knows its own e¢ciency parameter
 but does not observe  . Let ( j ) be the conditional density function on
the interval  2 [   ] which is known to all players in the game. Then at stage
4 before revelation, …rm  will choose its report ^ to maximize expected rent over





^(^  ) ( j ) (38)







To proceed further we need to restrict the density function. We assume a uniform
distribution and two extreme cases:  and  either perfectly correlated or com-
pletely independent. For the case of perfectly correlated shocks  ( =  = ),
say,  ( j ) = 1 if  = , and zero otherwise. Then






 ¡  (40)
For the case of independently distributed , ( j ) = ( )() and
expected pro…ts for the home …rm after reporting ^ are given by
 (^) =






= ((^)¡ ) +
1




^2 ¡  (41)
Now consider the incentive compatibility constraint (39) for these two cases. For



























With truthful reporting, ^(^  ) = ( ), given by (32). If  =  = , the

























using (32). Combining (43) and (44) we arrive at the …nal form of the incentive
compatibility constraint for the home country when  =  :















































and hence from (46) and (47)the …nal form of the incentive compatibility constraint
for the home country when  and  are independent is:







Stage 2. Mechanism Design
Given  and  , the social welfare function of the form (4) for the home country is
 (  ) = ( )¡(1+)[¡(  )(¡ ())]¡(  ) (49)
The home policy maker then designs a mechanism to maximise







(   )( j )
#
() (50)
subject to the  and the participation constraint:
 (( )) ¸ 0 for all  (51)
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( ) () (52)
subject to the  constraint, (48), and the participation constraint, which now
becomes ( )) ¸ 0 for all . This optimization problem is carried out using
Pontryagin’s maximum principle. De…ne the Hamiltonian










Let the control variables be  and . Then writing  as a function of these






= ¡ _ (55)
and the transversality condition () = 0. Some manipulation then leads to










_ = () (57)









Hence from (56) and (58) we arrive at







4( ¡ )(1 + _)
3(1 + )
(59)
Similarly for the  country







4( ¡ )(1 + _)
3(1 + )
(60)
Substituting for  and  from the Nash equilibrium at stage 3 we arrive at the
following di¤erential equations for the subsidies in the two countries:
4 +  = ¡
3
1 + 
+ ¡  ¡ 4( ¡ )(1 + _ ) (61)
4 +  = ¡
3
1 + 
+ ¡  ¡ 4 ( ¡ )(1 + _) (62)
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We look for solutions to these two di¤erential equations of the form
 = 

 ¡ ( ¡ )   =   (63)
where  are the subsidies under complete information found by solving (27). Con-
…ning ourselves to the symmetrical case  =  =  etc., substituting (63) into
(61) gives11




Thus from (63) and (64) we see that   

 and  is a decreasing function of .
We summarise our results as follows:
Proposition 3
For the symmetrical case where all parameters such as  are the same
in the two countries, the presence of asymmetric information leads to
lower subsidies, lower exports and a lower security threshold ¹ at which
subsidies cease compared with the complete information case.
For completely independent  the analysis goes through in a similar fashion
arriving at static equations for the subsidies
4 +  ( ( )) = ¡
3
1 + 
+ ¡ 2 +  ( )
¡ 8( ¡ ) (65)
4 + (()) = ¡
3
1 + 
+ ¡ 2 + ()
¡ 8 ( ¡  ) (66)
Taking expectations, this gives us two equations in (() and  (()) in
terms of ( )(

 ) and ( )(

 ), found by taking expectations of (27), and
() and  ( ). Proceeding as before the solution is given by
() = ( )(

 )¡ (()¡ )   =   (67)




   (68)




Asymmetric information reduces subsidies more on average (i.e., across
all realisations of the  parameters) when the parameters  are inde-
pendently distributed.
The intuition behind propositions 3 and 4 is as follows. Asymmetric information
reduces the incentive to subsidize because part of this transfer is absorbed as rent
by the more e¢cient …rm in order to induce truthful reporting of their private
information. This ‘screening e¤ect’ reduces subsidies and exports in equilibrium, so
less transparency in workings of the arms producers is actually a good thing. If the
unobserved e¢ciency parameters in the two countries are independently distributed
rather than equal, then the screening costs rise and the downward e¤ect on subsidies
is strengthened further.
5 Conclusions
This paper applies the tools of the strategic trade literature to the international
trade in arms. Owing to the WTO exemption this is probably the only area of trade
where we observe lump-sum and per unit transfers to exports. We have examined
the e¤ect of arms controls, in the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to
subsidize arms exports and conversely the e¤ect of the WTO arms trade exemption
on the incentives to break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms
controls and free trade commitments re-enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce
the incentive to subsidize and free trade without subsidies reduces the bene…ts of
a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens the Nash
ine¢ciencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and
lower arms exports. If and when the defence industry becomes more transparent,
then the abolition of the WTO exemption becomes more urgent.
In our paper, the impact of transparency on security is determined by the type
of information asymmetry introduced. We assume that the government is uncertain
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about a cost parameter. Other types of asymmetry could be considered, one of
them being the actual quality or quantity of weapons being exported by either the
domestic …rm or its competitors. This type of asymmetry is likely to have a very
di¤erent impact on security and this topic is the purpose of further research.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
From (29) we have that


= ¡ + (1 + )
¡ [ + (1 + )( ¡ ( ¡ )]
















































  = ¡ 2 (A.8)
 = ¡ 2 (A.9)
Substituting (A.2) to (A.9) into (A.1) a little algebra proves results (i) and (ii) in
proposition 2.
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